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NOTE
TORT LAW - THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE:
SHOULD IT APPLY IN THE FACE OF LEGISLATIVE
ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
COLEMAN V. COOPER
INTRODUCTION
The idea that the king can do no wrong no longer commands
support in the courts of this country. Nearly every state has abol-
ished or severely limited the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' In
North Carolina, the legislature has limited governmental immunity
by enacting two statutes. These statutes provide that immunity is
1. Comment, Local Government Sovereign Immunity: The Need For Re-
form, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 43, 46 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Local Govern-
ment Sovereign Immunity].
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 states:
Waiver of immunity through insurance purchase.
(a) Any city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability
in tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance.
(c) Any plaintiff may maintain a tort claim against a city insured
under this section in any court of competent jurisdiction. As to any such
claim, to the extent that the city is insured against such claim pursuant
to this section, governmental immunity shall be no defense.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1985).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435 states:
Liability Insurance; damage suits against a county involving governmen-
tal functions.
(a) A county may contract to insure itself and any of its officers,
agents, or employees against liability for wrongful death or negligent or
intentional damage to person or property or against absolute liability for
damage to person or property caused by an act or omission of the county
or any of its officers, agents, or employees when acting within the scope
of their authority and the course of their employment.
Purchase of insurance pursuant to this subsection waives the
county's governmental immunity, to the extent of insurance coverage, for
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waived when a county or city purchases liability insurance., The
Tort Claims Act limits governmental immunity as well by author-
izing suits against the State and its agencies.' However, in spite of
these recent limits on governmental immunity, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, in Coleman v. Cooper,5 recently expanded gov-
ernmental immunity by applying the public duty doctrine. 6 The
public duty doctrine prevents an action against a governmental en-
tity from being maintained when the action concerns a breach of a
duty owed to the general public. 7 The doctrine holds that for the
any act or omission occurring in the exercise of a governmental function.
(b) If a county has waived its governmental immunity pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section, any person, or if he dies, his personal rep-
resentative, sustaining damages as a result of an act or omission of the
county or any of its officers, agents, or employees, occurring in the exer-
cise of a governmental function, may sue the county for recovery of dam-
ages. To the extent of the coverage of insurance purchased pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section governmental immunity may not be a de-
fense to the action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435 (1985).
3. Id.
4. The North Carolina Tort Claims Act, Chapter 143 of the North Carolina
General Statutes provides in § 143-291 for the North Carolina Industrial Commis-
sion to preside over tort claims against the state and its agencies. § 143-291 states:
The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each individ-
ual claim arose as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, in-
voluntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of
his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under circumstances
where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1987).
The effect of the Act is to waive the sovereign immunity of the state
when injury is caused by the negligence of a state employee, giving the
injured party the same right to sue as any other litigant. Guthrie v.
North Carolina State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 299 S.E.2d 618 (1983).
5. Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2 (1988), discr. rev. den.,
322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988).
6. Id.
7. E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.04b, at 165 (3rd
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter McQUILLIN]. McQuillin writes that the elimi-
nation of sovereign immunity places the government tortfeasor on the same level
as any other, it does not create any new liability. Id. He goes on to state however,
that
[T]he tort liability of a public official is not in all circumstances identical
with that of a private individual. The public duty rule is a rule which
provides that in order for an injured person to recover against a munici-
pality he must show the breach of a duty owed to him as an individual
504 [Vol. 12:503
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breach of a public duty no action lies on behalf of any individual.8
Coleman involved an action brought against a municipality for
negligence in failing to provide police protection.9 In applying the
public duty doctrine, the court held that the city owed only a pub-
lic duty to provide police protection, and that failure to provide
such protection does not give rise to a cause of action on behalf of
any particular individual.1" The court applied the doctrine despite
the fact that the City of Raleigh, a defendant in the case, had pur-
chased liability insurance.1' The court treated the doctrine as if it
had applicability outside the context of governmental immunity
through the basic premise of tort law that there is no liability un-
less the law imposes a duty.12 The court stated that as the duty to
provide police protection is a duty to the general public, no liabil-
ity exists for any specific individual. 3
This Note analyzes the Coleman case. The Note suggests that
and not merely the breach of an obligation owing to the general public.
Id.
8. Id. McQuillin states that just as it is necessary that the plaintiff show that
the private corporation has breached a duty owing to him in order to sustain his
cause of action, he must show the breach of a duty owed to him by the municipal
corporation. However, he goes on to state that unless there is a "special relation-
ship creating a municipal duty to exercise care for the benefit of a particular class
of individuals, no liability may be imposed upon a municipality for failure to
enforce a statute or regulation or to provide protection or services to a particular
individual or class of individuals." Id. (emphasis added) (citing cases).
9. Coleman, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2 (1988).
10. Id. at 193, 366 S.E.2d at 6.
11. Id. at 191, 366 S.E.2d at 5.
12. Id. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 5. The court stated:
A more difficult question is presented by the lower court's order
granting summary judgment for the City of Raleigh. Ordinarily, a munic-
ipality providing police services is engaged in a governmental function
for which there is no liability (citation omitted). By purchasing liability
insurance, municipalities in this State waive the defense of governmental
immunity to the extent of insurance coverage. G.S. 160A-485. A waiver of
governmental immunity, however, does not create a cause of action
where none previously existed (citations omitted).
In. tort, it is axiomatic that there is no liability unless the law im-
poses a duty (citation omitted).
Id.
The court goes on to state that when furnishing police protection a munici-
pality acts for the benefit of the public at large and not for any specific individual.
Therefore, the breach of such a public duty cannot give rise to a cause of action
for an individual. Id.
13. Id., 366 S.E.2d at 6.
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the court incorrectly applied the public duty doctrine where the
defense of governmental immunity had been waived. First, the
Note traces the background of the public duty doctrine. Second,
the Note discusses the facts and holding of the Coleman case.
Next, the note focuses on cases from other jurisdictions that have
analyzed the public duty doctrine and its relation to governmental
immunity. Finally, the Note addresses the issue of whether there is
a real distinction between governmental immunity and the public
duty doctrine.
BACKGROUND
A frequently quoted statement of the public duty doctrine is
found in Cooley's treatise on the law of torts. Cooley writes:
In order that a public officer shall be liable to an individual in
tort, it is necessary that the officer shall have violated some legal
duty owing by him to such individual, as a result of which viola-
tion the individual has suffered damage. For the mere failure of
an officer to perform a public duty owing by him to the public at
large, as for example, the duty of a legislator to act honestly, or of
an executive officer to enforce the laws, no action lies by an
individual.'
The public duty doctrine may have its origin in the early
United States Supreme Court case of South v. Maryland. 5 In
South the plaintiff sued the sheriff alleging the sheriff negligently
failed to protect him from a mob. ' The Court held that no cause
of action existed for a breach of the sheriff's duties as conservator
of the peace.17 Concerning such duty the Court stated, "[i]t is a
public duty, for neglect of which he is amenable to the public, and
punishable by indictment only."18
Twenty American jurisdictions currently recognize the public
duty doctrine.1 9 However, Prosser writes that the foundations of
14. COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 60, at 144 (rev. student's ed.
1930).
15. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
16. Id. at 399.
17. Id. at 403.
18. Id.
19. See, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental Unit
From Tort Liability On Theory That Only General, Not Particular, Duty Was
Owed Under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R. 4TH 1194, 1197-1200 (1985 & Supp. 1989)
[hereinafter Annotation]. (Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, In-
diana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
506 [Vol. 12:503
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the doctrine have been eroded in part by a number of decisions
that have rejected, discounted or narrowed its scope.20 In fact, ten
jurisdictions that formerly recognized the public duty doctrine
have flatly rejected it."
The doctrine is routinely applied by the courts in cases where
a duty to provide police protection is alleged.22 However, the doc-
trine has also been applied where a city provides services such as
inspections mandated by building and fire codes. 3 The courts con-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington).
North Carolina should be added to the list provided by the annotation.
20. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 131, at 1049 (5th ed. 1984).
21. See, Annotation, supra note 19, at 1203-05. Alaska, Adams v. State, 555
P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (action against the state by persons injured in a motel
fire); Arizona, Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 697 (1982) (action against
state by person injured by escapee from state institution); Colorado, Leake v.
Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (action by parents of teenagers killed by drunk
driver who police failed to take into custody); Florida, Commercial Carrier v. In-
dian River County, 371 So. 2d (Fla. 1979) (action against county for failure to
maintain stop sign at intersection); Iowa, Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664
(Iowa 1979) (action against city for negligent safety inspection of building that
burned, killing decedents); Nebraska, Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 384 N.W.2d
.254 (1986) (action against municipality for negligence of its employees); New
Mexico, Schear v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984)
(action against sheriff's department for failure to respond to a rape);. Louisiana,
Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980) (court found special duty, but
stated that mere fact that duty is public does not require finding of no liability);
Oregon, Brennan v. Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979) (court held that
public duty rule precluded by statute establishing governmental liability); Wis-
consin, Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (failure of
building inspector to detect defective standpipes); See also, Hopkins v. State, 237
Kan. 601, 702 P.2d 311 (1985) (court held that it was improper to grant summary
judgment on ground that duty of law enforcement to preserve peace was a public
duty where it was not determined whether officers acted needlessly, maliciously,
or wantonly).
22. See generally Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent
Crime, 94 HARv. L. REV. 821 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Police Liability]; Note,
Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 VILL. L. REV. 505 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Government Liability].
23. MCQUILLIN, supra note 7, § 53.04b, at 166 (citing cases); Comment, Mu-
nicipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National
Survey, 58 WASH. L. REV. 537, 548 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Municipal Tort
Liability]. The author notes two specific exceptions that apply when the claim is
based on erroneous issuance of building permits: (1) where the claimant estab-
lishes a "clear intent" in the statute to benefit a particular class of individuals,
and (2) where the claimant can establish a "special relationship" with the munici-
pality. Id. at 549. However, the author states that "[blecause courts have con-
strued the exceptions to the public duty doctrine very narrowly, the doctrine has
1990] 507
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sider these services performed for the benefit of the public in gen-
eral and not for the benefit of any particular individual.24
The major exception to the public duty doctrine is the special
relationship or special duty exception.2" One scholar describes the
exception:
Where a municipality assumes a duty to a particular person or
class of persons, it must perform that duty in a nonnegligent
manner notwithstanding that if it had not assumed that duty
none would have otherwise existed. Once the duty is assumed, a
special duty or special relationship comes into existence, and an
individual or class of individuals who detrimentally rely upon the
authorities' assumption of the duty, may recover damages proxi-
mately caused by the authorities' failure to carry out the duty in
a nonnegligent manner.26
An often cited example of the special duty exception is the
case of Schuster v. City of New York.27 In Schuster the plaintiff
brought an action to recover for wrongful death against the city for
its negligence in failing to provide protection for the decedent,
Schuster. 28 Schuster supplied information to the New York City
Police concerning the whereabouts of Willie Sutton, a nationally
known criminal.29 Schuster requested that the police provide him
with protection after receiving threats.30 The police refused.31
Schuster was subsequently shot to death. 32 The court held that the
city owed Schuster a special duty to use reasonable care to protect
him from harm.33 The court stated that this duty arose once
Schuster collaborated with the police in the arrest of Sutton, and
when it was apparent that he was in danger due to such
collaboration. 4
become a very successful municipal defense to tort liability." Id. at 552.
24. McQUILLIN, supra note 7, § 53.04b, at 166.
25. Id., § 53.04c, at 171-72; Note, Police Liability, supra note 22, at 824.
26. McQuILLIN, supra note 7, § 53.04c, at 171-72.
27. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, (1958).
28. 5 N.Y.2d at -, 154 N.E.2d at 536, 180 N.Y.S.2d at
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
.32. Id.
33. Id. at -, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at __.
34. Id.; See, Note, Police Liability, supra note 22. The author notes that
since the Schuster decision courts have expanded the special relationship excep-
tion to police nonliability. The author lists five fact patterns defining the limits of
this expansion. The author states that in the first two police liability is usually
[Vol. 12:503
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ANALYSIS
A. Facts and Holding of the Coleman Decision
In Coleman, an employee of the Wake County Department of
Social Services (Cooper) received information that a father had
sexually abused two of his minor daughters.3 5  The girls told
Cooper about specific instances of sexual abuse. 6 The plaintiff, the
girls' mother, confirmed the story.3 7 Plaintiff told Cooper that she
feared what Coleman might do if he found out about the investiga-
tion.3 8 Cooper assured plaintiff of police protection. 9
Officer Phillips of the Raleigh Police interviewed the girls.40
The girls told Officer Phillips of the abuse'and that they were not
afraid of Coleman."1 Officer Phillips subsequently interviewed
found, while in the last three it is not: (1) Where the plaintiff is harmed as a
consequence of his giving aid to police, e.g., as an informant; (2) Where the police
have promised protection to a specific individual; (3) Where police are aware of
danger to a specific individual, but do not put the individual into jeopardy
through affirmative action and do not promise protection; (4) Where police are
aware of a source of danger to the public, but cannot foresee a specific victim; (5)
Where police are aware of a general threat, e.g., a crime wave. The author states
that the fact patterns can be placed on an "intimacy spectrum." The more inti-
mate the individual's relationship with the police, the more likely courts are liable
to find a special duty. Id. at 825-28. The author states that "[tlhis judicial re-
sponse is disappointing, for it neither serves justice nor advances policy to make
the duty of protection hinge primarily on the degree of intimacy between the po-
lice and the victim." Id. at 828; But cf., Comment, Washington's Special Rela-
tionship Exception To The Public Duty Doctrine, 64 WASH. L. REv. 401 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Special Relationship]. The author notes that in Washing-
ton courts have restricted the special relationship test. The author states that the
special relationship test enunciated in J&B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash.
2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983), found the special relationship as long as there was
direct contact between the government and the individual, coupled with implied
assurances through issuance of a building permit that the individual had complied
with building codes. Id. at 405-06. The new rule set down by later decisions is
that there must be express, as opposed to implied, assurances from the govern-
mental entity. Id. at 406.
35. 89 N.C. App. 188, 189, 366 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1988), discr. rev. den., 322 N.C.
834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988).
36. 89 N.C. App. at 189, 366 S.E.2d at 4.
37. Id. at 190, 366 S.E.2d at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
1990] 509
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Coleman as well."2
Officer Phillips testified before a Wake County Grand Jury on
April 1, 1985 concerning the sexual abuse of the minor girls. 3 That
same day the Grand Jury issued an indictment against Coleman."
The next day Officer Phillips had orders of arrest prepared for
Coleman. 45 The police department prepared the orders of arrest on
April 2.46 However, Officer Phillips did not pick them up that day
because he was involved in another investigation. 47 Before Cole-
man was arrested on April 3, 1985, he went to the plaintiff's home
and murdered the two girls. 8
Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action alleging negligence
on the part of Cooper, Wake County, the City of Raleigh and the
Raleigh Police Department.4 9 The suit alleged that the defendants
failed to take steps to ensure the safety of plaintiffs' daughters."'
No one disputed the fact that the Raleigh Police had no policy of
providing police protection to potential witnesses in a criminal
case. " However, the court Stated that both the City of Raleigh and
Wake County had purchased liability insurance and thus waived
governmental immunity.52
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the City of Raleigh. 5- The court of ap-
peals then reversed the grant of summary judgment for Cooper
and Wake County.5 4 The court stated that although the city pur-
42. Id. Officer Phillips observed that Coleman was a calm, well-dressed indi-
vidual. Coleman's entire criminal record consisted of a speeding conviction. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Officer Phillips contacted the Wake County District Attorney's office
at 5:00 p.m. on April 1, and was informed that true bills of indictment had been
issued against Coleman. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Officer Phillips phoned Coleman's attorney and informed him of the
grand jury's action. Coleman's attorney said he would ask Coleman to turn him-
self in the next day. Id.
48. Id. at 191, 366 S.E.2d at 4.
49. Id. at 189, 366 S.E.2d at 3. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Raleigh Police Department stating that absent a statute authorizing such a
suit, the police department could not be sued since it is not a person in being, but
only a component part of the city. Id. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 5.
50. Id. at 189, 366 S.E.2d at 3.
51. Id. at 191, 366 S.E.2d at 4.
52. Id. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 5.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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chased liability insurance and thus had waived any defense of gov-
ernmental immunity, such a waiver could not create a cause of ac-
tion where none previously existed.5 5 The court held that the city
owed no duty to provide police protection to plaintiff's daughters.5 6
The court stated:
In furnishing police protection, a municipality ordinarily acts for
the benefit of the public at large and not for a specific individual.
(citations omitted) As the duty is to the general public rather
than to a specific individual, no liability exists for the failure to
furnish police protection. "
The court went on to discuss the special relationship excep-
tion." The exception applies when a special relationship exists be-
tween the injured party and the police." However, the court held
that no special relationship existed.2 The interview was the only
connection between Officer Phillips and the girls. 1
The court noted a second exception to the public duty doc-
trine.6 2 This exception is applied where the police create a special
duty by promising protection. Regarding this exception, the court
stated that the Raleigh Police had promised no such protection."
The court stated that although Officer Phillips was aware of prior
acts of violence by Coleman,65 the girls told Officer Phillips that
they were not afraid of Coleman. 6 The court closed the door on
unlimited liability by finding that the girls were merely potential
witnesses.6
As for defendants Cooper and Wake County, the court stated
that N.C.G.S. § 7A-544 creates a duty on the part of the Wake
County Department of Social Services.68 This duty calls for the
55. Id.
56. Id. at 193, 366 S.E.2d at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 193-94, 366 S.E.2d at 6.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 194-95, 366 S.E.2d at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 194, 366 S.E.2d at 6.
63. Id.
64. Id., 366 S.E.2d at 7.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 195, 366 S.E.2d at 7. The court stated, "If liability were to be im-
posed on the city in this instance, law enforcement in this State would be re-
quired to protect almost every potential witness to avoid liability." Id.
68. Id. at 196-97, 366 S.E.2d at 7-8.
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protection of minors whom the Department determines to be vic-
tims of abuse. 9 The court stated that a breach of this duty gives
rise to an action for negligence.
B. Cases That Have Recently Reconsidered the Public Duty
Doctrine
Was the court of appeals correct in applying the public duty
doctrine? Several jurisdictions have refused to recognize the doc-
trine in the face of legislative abrogation or limitation of sovereign
immunity.71 These courts have concluded that the doctrine is noth-
ing more than a continuation of sovereign immunity."'
One such jurisdiction is Alaska.73 The Supreme Court of
69. Id. The court stated that a standard of conduct may be determined by
reference to a statute which imposes a specific duty for the purpose of protecting
others. The court stated that a violation of such a statutorily provided duty would
be negligence per se, (citing, Lutz Industries, v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332,
88 S.E.2d 333 (1955)). Id. at 195, 366 S.E.2d at 7. The court also cited the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, § 286 in support of this view. The particular section
quoted provides:
When Standard of Conduct Defined by Legislation or Regulation
Will Be Adopted
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man
the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regula-
tion whose purpose is found to be exclusively in whole or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose inter-
est is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has re-
sulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which
the harm results.
Id. at 196, 366 S.E.2d at 7.
The court stated that the General Assembly had enacted N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-544 as the standard of conduct to be exercised by the Department of Social
Services for the protection of abused juveniles. The court stated that the plain-
tiff's minor daughters were within the class the statute was intended to protect,
and that the harm Coleman inflicted upon them was the specific type of harm the
statute was intended to prevent. Id. at 197, 366 S.E.2d at 8.
70. Id. at 197, 366 S.E.2d at 8. The court held that it was a question of fact
for the jury whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in breaching her
common law duty to protect her children. Id. at 198-99, 366 S.E.2d at 8-9.
71. E. McQUILLIN, supra note 7, § 53.04b, at 166.
72. Id.
73. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (superceded by statute on
other grounds, Wilson v. Anchorage, 669 P.2d (Alaska 1983)).
[Vol. 12:503
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Alaska, in Adams v. State7 ' delivered a harsh criticism of the pub-
lic duty doctrine often cited by other courts that have rejected it.7 5
The plaintiffs, as injured victims and personal representatives of
deceased victims of a hotel fire, filed suit against the state."
The state Fire Marshall inspected the hotel several months
prior to the fire and detected various hazards." The marshall
promised the hotel manager that he would outline the steps
needed to correct the hazardous conditions in a letter.78 However,
the marshall failed to send the letter.7 9 The state took no action to
alleviate the fire hazards.80
The trial court granted summary judgment for the State."1
The Alaskan Supreme Court reversed,82 holding that the state had
assumed a common law duty by its affirmative conduct in inspect-
ing the Hotel.8 3 The court also held that the duty was owed to the
occupants of the hotel injured in the fire, not just to the general
public.8 4 In rejecting the public duty doctrine the court stated:
Second, we consider that the "duty to all, duty to no-one" doc-
trine is in reality a form of sovereign immunity, which is a matter
dealt with by statute in Alaska, and not to be amplified by court-
created doctrine. An application of the public duty doctrine here
would result in finding no duty owed the plaintiffs or their dece-
dents by the state, because, although they were foreseeable vic-
tims and a private defendant would have owed such a duty, no
"special relationship" between the parties existed. Why should
the establishment of duty become more difficult when the state is
the defendant? Where there is no immunity, the state is to be
treated like a private litigant. To allow the public duty doctrine
to disturb this equality would create immunity where the legisla-
ture has not.8
The court stated that the legislature, through the statute authoriz-
ing tort claims against the state, had adopted a policy of risk-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 236.
77. Id. at 238.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 239.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 236.
82. Id. at 244.
83. Id. at 240.
84. Id. at 241.
85. Id. at 241-42.
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spreading in which society, rather than the individual, should bear
the cost of the state's negligence. 6
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the public duty doc-
trine in the case of Leake v. Cain. The case involved an action by
the parents of six teenagers who were killed when struck by a car
driven by eighteen year old Ralph Crowe. 8 Crowe attended a party
that the police broke up when neighbors complained.89 Crowe
drank an excessive amount of alcohol at the party. 0 The police
handcuffed and detained him after he became disruptive."1 How-
ever, they released Crowe to the care of his younger brother.2
Crowe's brother later allowed Crowe to drive to the location where
the party had resumed." It was there that Crowe struck and killed
the six teenagers.9
The trial court granted summary judgment for the police on
the basis of the public duty doctrine.9 The court of appeals re-
versed for other reasons, failing to discuss the lower court's appli-
cation of the public duty doctrine.96 The supreme court did discuss
the doctrine to clear up conflicting decisions in the court of
appeals.9
The court discussed many of the problems associated with the
doctrine. 8 The court cited as a major problem its harsh effect on
would-be plaintiffs, who possibly could recover if not for the public
status of the tortfeasor. 9 The court found the doctrine in apparent
contravention to statutes abrogating sovereign immunity because it
makes the status of the defendant a crucial factor in determining
liability.100 The court pointed out that the arguments in support of
the doctrine are the same as that used to support sovereign immu-
86. Id. at 244.
87. 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
88. Id. at 153-54.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 153. Crowe's blood alcohol level was .20 at the time of the acci-
dent. Id. at 154.
91. Id. at 154.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 154-55.
97. Id. at 157.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 159.
100. Id.
[Vol. 12:503
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nity.101 The court stated that if this policy basis has been rejected
by statutes abrogating sovereign immunity, it should also be re-
jected as a policy basis in support of the public duty doctrine. 102
The court thought this was especially true if the doctrine is seen as
a function of sovereign immunity, rather than an independent con-
cept of negligence. 0 3
The court came to the conclusion that at least in effect the
public duty doctrine is virtually the same as that of sovereign im-
munity." 4 In rejecting the doctrine the court stated:
In our view, the problems associated with the public duty
rule far outweigh the benefits of the rule, which are more properly
realized by other means. The fear of excessive governmental lia-
bility is largely baseless in view of the fact that a plaintiff seeking
damages for tortious conduct against a public entity must estab-
lish the existence of a duty using conventional tort principles,
such as foreseeability, in the same manner as if the defendant
were a private entity. (citation omitted). Another hurdle the
plaintiff must surmount in order to recover is proof of proximate
cause. The traditional burdens of proof tied to tort law ade-
quately limit governmental liability without resort to the artificial
distinctions engendered by the public duty rule.'0 5
The court stated that the Colorado legislature had abrogated the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 06 Nothing in the statutes dealing
with governmental immunity indicated that the legislature in-
tended to introduce a concept so closely related to sovereign
immunity. 07
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the public duty doc-
trine in Schear v. Board of County Commissioners.08 The case in-
volved an action brought by a woman who had suffered a brutal
101. Id. The court noted the two arguments most often made; that imposing
tort liability would result in financial ruin for government, and judicial interfer-
ence in government operations. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 160. The court stated, "Whether or not the public duty rule is a
function of sovereign immunity, the effect of the rule is identical to that of sover-
eign immunity. Under both doctrines, the existence of liability depends entirely
upon the public status of the defendant." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984).
1990]
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rape.1"9 The woman alleged that the sheriff's department negli-
gently failed to respond to a crime in progress. " The court of ap-
peals, relying on Doe v. Hendricks,' affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of the woman's action. " 2 The supreme court reversed."'
The court stated that the public duty doctrine relied on in Doe was
simply too closely linked with the concept of sovereign immunity
to have been included within the traditional tort concepts of
duty." 4 The court further held "[a]lthough many jurisdictions had
relied on the [public duty-special duty] distinction (citations omit-
ted), the development in the law has been to abolish it in those
jurisdictions where the matter has been more recently considered
or reconsidered."' 5
Both the Arizona and Florida Supreme Courts have reconsid-
ered the public duty doctrine."' Both states rejected earlier deci-
sions that applied it." 7 Courts of other jurisdictions had frequently
cited these rejected decisions in support of the doctrine. In Ryan v.
State" the Arizona Supreme Court overruled Massengil v. Yuma
County."9 The court stated that it would no longer seek to deter-
109. Id. at __ , 687 P.2d at 729.
110. Id.
111. 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (1979) (Doe was a case brought by a young
boy who was dragged into an abandoned house and sexually molested. He was
unsuccessful in his suit against the police for not promptly responding to calls for
help from those who had witnessed the attack due to the view of the New Mexico'
Court of Appeals that the duty of the police is only a public duty.)
112. 101 N.M. at __ , 687 P.2d at 729.
113. Id.
114. Id. at -, 687 P.2d at 730. The court noted that the legislature pro-
vided for an exception to the rule of sovereign immunity by passing the Tort
Claims Act. Id.
115. Id. at -, 687 P.2d at 731.
116. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
117. Id.
118. 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (Plaintiff sued the state of Arizona,
Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections and Director of the Arizona
Youth Center for injuries he received when an inmate at the Arizona Youth
Center escaped from custody and shot him with a sawed-off shotgun while rob-
bing a convenience store.)
119. 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969) (This action was brought against the
Sheriff of Yuma County for negligence of his deputy who made no attempt to
stop a man he witnessed pull out of the parking lot of a tavern. The deputy fol-
lowed the man and observed him driving recklessly but did not pull him over.
The driver of the car was involved in an accident that resulted in the death of five
persons, leaving a sixth totally disabled.)
[Vol. 12:503516
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mine if a duty is general or specific.120 The court held "We shall no
longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether
the tort-feasor has a general duty to the injured party, which spells
no recovery, or if he had a specific individual duty which means
recovery."' 1
The Florida Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier v. Indian
River County 2 rejected the public duty doctrine that had been
adopted in Modlin v. City of Miami Beach.23 The court held that
the doctrine did not survive legislative enactment of a statute au-
thorizing suits against the state, its agencies and subdivisions.' 2"
The court stated, "[riegardless, it is clear that the Modlin doctrine
is a function of municipal sovereign immunity and not a tradi-
tional negligence concept which has meaning apart from the gov-
ernmental setting. Accordingly, its efficacy is dependent on the
continuing vitality of the doctrine of sovereign immunity."'211
C. Rationale of the Coleman Decision
Although the court in Coleman applied the public duty doc-
trine as if it had some viability outside of the context of govern-
mental immunity, the effect of the doctrine is to give a public de-
fendant a preferred status. 26 The policy rationale relied on by the
court in granting the City of Raleigh such a preferred status is that
set forth by the court of appeals of New York in Riss v. City of
New York.127 The court in Coleman quoted Riss, stating:
120. Id. at , 456 P.2d at 599.
121. Id.
122. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979) (Defendant in an automobile collision case
filed a third-party complaint against Indian River County alleging negligence in
the County's failure to maintain a stop sign at the intersection where the collision
occurred.).
123. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967) (court held that city was not liable for building
inspector's negligence in failing to inspect store mezzanine which fell and killed a
patron).
124. 371 So. 2d at 1015.
125. Id.
126. See generally Note, Government Liability, supra note 22. The author
states, "Generally, absent a 'special relationship' between the injured plaintiff and
the government, the public duty doctrine effectively provides a common law im-
munity for the negligent acts of government officials." Id. at 506. The author also
states, "[C]ourts applying the public duty doctrine effectively restrict govern-
ment's duty to individuals. Government is thereby favored over private parties in
defending against negligence actions." Id. at 519-20.
127. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (This was an
1990] 517
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The amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the
resources of the community and by a considered legislative-execu-
tive decision as to how those resources may be deployed. For the
courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the
law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of
protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably
determine how the limited police resources . . . should be allo-
cated and without predictable limits." 8
However, is this rationale not the same justification usually as-
serted in support of sovereign immunity? That is, to impose liabil-
ity on public entities will result in financial disaster for those enti-
ties, and in addition, permit judicial interference with legislative
and executive decision-making. 12 9
The argument that abolishing the public duty doctrine will
bankrupt government fails to recognize that many actions have
been maintained and won against government entities where legis-
lative limitations on sovereign immunity have allowed such ac-
tions. As Judge Keating stated in his dissenting opinion in Riss,
No municipality has gone bankrupt because it had to respond in
damages when a policeman causes injury through carelessly driv-
ing a police car or in the thousands of other situations where by
judicial fiat or legislative enactment, the state and its subdivisions
have been held liable for the tortious conduct of their
employees. I's
North Carolina courts have repeatedly held the state, counties and
cities liable under the statutes authorizing suits against those enti-
ties.1 3 ' Furthermore, the ability of the tortfeasor to pay a damage
action by a young woman who was brutally attacked by a rejected suitor. She
alleged that the city was negligent in failing to provide protection after she had
requested it, and had informed the police of threats her attacker had made.)
128. 89 N.C. App. 188, 193, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1988) (quoting Riss, 240 N.E.2d
at 860-61).
129. See Comment, Local Government Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1, at
53-54. The author cites as two of the major policy considerations underlying sov-
ereign immunity, financial considerations and separation of powers. Id.; See also
Note, Police Liability, supra note 22, at 832-33. Although the author states that
"[m]ost courts mask policy considerations with a conclusory application of the no-
duty rule", the two most frequently used policy arguments noted are "U]udicial
reluctance to interfere with executive discretion" and "[j]udicial fear of the finan-
cial impact of expanded police liability." Id.
130. 22 N.Y.2d at __, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at -, (J. Keating,
dissenting).
131. See, e.g., Geiger v. Guilford College Community Volunteer Fireman's
[Vol. 12:503
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award is not a proper inquiry in determining if liability should be
imposed in the first instance.182
Where laws have been enacted that limit or abolish govern-
mental immunity, basic principals of tort law such as proximate
cause, foreseeability and contributory negligence should serve as
limits to liability.1" Instead, the public duty doctrine denies liabil-
Ass'n, 668 F. Supp. 492 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (nonprofit fire company employed by
county held liable for negligence in rescue attempt to the extent of insurance cov-
erage.); White v. Mote, 270 N.C. 544, 155 S.E.2d 75 (1967) (City found liable for
negligent operation of chemical fogging machine.); McNeil v. Durham County
ABC Bd., 87 N.C. App. 50, 359 S.E.2d 500 (1987) (County ABC Board may be
held liable for an assault committed by its officer to the extent of liability insur-
ance.); Roach v. City of Lenoir, 44 N.C. App. 608, 261 S.E.2d 299 (1980) (City
may be held liable for negligent operation of a sewer system if liability has been
waived through purchase of liability insurance.); Bullman v. North Carolina State
Highway Comm'n, 18 N.C. App. 94, 195 S.E.2d 803 (1973) (State Highway Com-
mission held liable for negligence of employee in operating truck at excessive
speed.); Cogburn v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 14 N.C. App. 544,
188 S.E.2d 553 (1972) (State Highway Commission found liable for employee's
negligent operation of a dump truck.); Stroud v. North Carolina Memorial Hosp.,
15 N.C. App. 592, 190 S.E.2d 392 (1972) (State Hospital found liable for em-
ployee's negligence in spilling salad dressing causing plaintiff to slip and fall.).
132. See Note, Government Liability, supra note 22, at 536.
133. As Judge Keating stated in his dissenting opinion in Riss, "The argu-
ment is also made as if there were no such legal principles as fault, proximate
cause or foreseeability, all of which operate to keep liability within reasonable
bounds." 22 N.Y.2d at -, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at -, (J. Keating,
dissenting). He further states, "To deny liability on ordinary principals of tort law
offers a far better approach to the question of municipal tort liability than the
fiction that there is no duty running to the general public." 22 N.Y.2d at __,
240 N.E.2d at 866-67, 293 N.Y.S.2d at __ . See also Note, Government Liability,
supra note 22, at 530. The author states, "[E]ven if the public duty doctrine is
abrogated, police officers are sufficiently protected from meritless suits by .
conventional tort analysis ... " Id.; But See Comment, Municipal Tort Liabil-
ity, supra note 23, at 554-60. The author states that the minority position, which
substitutes a conventional tort foreseeability analysis for the public duty rule is
faulty in two respects: (1) it wrongfully expands municipal tort liability beyond
that imposed on private tortfeasors, and (2) such expansion in government tort
liability based on the minority position is poor public policy. Id. at 554. The au-
thor's position is that the minority view expands government-liability by provid-
ing an individual with a cause of action for the breach of a public duty. Id. at 555.
However, that is begging the question since the minority view is that any duty
owed to the public is owed to individual members of the public. Yet, the minority
view would limit liability through a traditional tort analysis rather than a con-
clusory finding of no duty. The author cites as the two policy justifications for the
minority position; to deter government officials from approaching their duties
frivolously, and to place the risk of erroneous permit issuance on the government.
17
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ity altogether if the government-defendant was engaged in a "pub-
lic duty," one for the benefit of the public. This sounds much like
the principal of sovereign immunity. Namely, that a governmental
entity can only be held liable if engaged in a "proprietary", as op-
posed to a "governmental" function."' However, the statutes en-
Id. at 558. The author disagrees that imposing liability on the government will
provide an incentive for government to do its job correctly, because government
may not be able to afford to do its job correctly. Id. at 559. However, the elimina-
tion of governmental immmunity extends liability to public as well as private de-
fendants. It is no excuse for government to say it can act negligently because it is
too expensive to act otherwise. The authors' view is that the burden of erroneous
permit issuance should fall on the developer, not government. Id. at 560. How-
ever, liability should fall on the entity whose negligence caused the injury. The
minority position seeks to impose liability on the negligent party regardless of
that partys' public or private status. Id. at 559-60.
134. See generally Comment, Local Government Sovereign Immunity, supra
note 1, at 44. The author states:
Municipal corporations exercise their powers in dual modes, either
governmental or proprietary. In the governmental mode, municipalities
function as extensions of the state by performing activities authorized by
the state for the public benefit. Acts in this mode are protected by sover-
eign immunity because they are carried out on behalf of the state. In the
proprietary, or corporate mode, municipalities operate as corpora-
tions. . . . In this corporate mode, municipalities are legal individuals
required to use ordinary care and are subject to tort actions, just as is
any private corporation or individual.
Id.
In Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) the
court states:
The "public duty" - "special duty" distinction espoused in cases cited by
the City of Milwaukee and Legrand set up just the type of artificial dis-
tinction between "proprietary" and "governmental" functions which this
court sought to dispose of in Holytz, supra. Any duty owed to the public
generally is a duty owed to individual members of the public.
Id. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 139.
See also 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 25.06, at 457-59 (1958).
K. Davis writes about a California case where the plaintiffs were denied a cause of
action against the city for negligence in failing to maintain city fire fighting equip-
ment. The court sustained the defendant's demurer despite the fact that a statute
specifically provided for liability. Quoting the court's statement in support of its
ruling Davis writes:
The court held that a demurer was properly sustained because: "Upon
analysis, it clearly appears that the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is
the failure of a governmental function. Such failure involves a denial of a
benefit owing to the community as a whole, but does not constitute a
wrong or injury to a member thereof so as to give rise to a right of indi-
vidual redress. . . ." Id. at 458 (quoting, Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38
18
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acted in North Carolina that allow cities and counties to waive im-
munity through purchase of liability insurance preclude the
government as tortfeasor from relying on any distinction between
governmental-proprietary functions as a limit to liability. 135 In-
stead these statutes limit liability by maintaining that immunity is
waived only to the extent of the insurance purchased. 136 Likewise,
the Tort Claims Act limits liability by providing that the plaintiff
cannot be awarded in excess of $100,O00. 137
Cal.2d 486, 489, 240 P.2d 980, 982 (1952).)
K. Davis further states, "[Slurely when a court construes away such an unequivo-
cal statutory provision, the judicial responsibility for governmental irresponsibil-
ity is very grave indeed." Id. at 459.
135. The statute providing that any city may waive its liability through
purchase of insurance provides "[a]ny plaintiff may maintain a tort claim against
a city insured under this section in any court of competent jurisdiction. As to any
such claim, to the extent that the city is insured against such claim pursuant to
this section, governmental immunity shall be no defense." N.C. GEN. STAT. §
160A-485(c) (1985) (emphasis added). Likewise, the statute providing for counties
to waive immunity by purchasing insurance provides, "To the extent of the cover-
age of insurance purchased pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, governmen-
tal immunity may not be a defense to the action." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435
(1985) (emphasis added).
See also Comment, Municipal Tort Liability and the Public Duty Rule: A
Matter of Statutory Analysis, 6 W. MIT. L. REV. 391, 405-08 (1980). The author
notes that in adopting the public duty rule in Cracraft v. St. Louis Park, 279
N.W.2d 801 (1979), the court relied on an earlier decision which was premised on
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions. Id. at 405. Criti-
cizing the Cracraft rationale the author states that this distinction was specifi-
cally abolished by the Minnesota legislature when it enacted the Minnesota Mu-
nicipal Tort Liability Act. Id. at 408. The author states that "[in abolishing
sovereign immunity, the Legislature necessarily abolished the governmental-pro-
prietary distinction because a municipality performing a governmental function is
thereby acting in its sovereign capacity and able to assert sovereign' immunity.
Similarly, a municipality performing a proprietary function is not acting in its
sovereign capacity and is not able to assert sovereign immunity." Id., n. 123. It
goes without saying that N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-485 & 153A-435 abolished any
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions where the city or
county has waived immunity through the purchase of liability insurance.
136. See Comment, Local Government Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1, at
55. The author states:
The insurance thus purchased establishes definite limits of liability of
the governmental entity and thus brings predictability to the area of tort
damage awards. By acquiring predictability, local governments can elimi-
nate the risks of serious fiscal impairment to the governmental unit occa-
sioned by the lack of limits on tort damage awards.
Id.
137. The North Carolina Tort Claims Act provides "[I]n no event shall the
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For a case where liability was limited by principals of tort law
rather than the public duty doctrine consider Cook v. Burk
County.138 The plaintiff alleged the county negligently failed to
keep the sidewalk clear of pigeon droppings. 139 The county had
waived immunity through purchase of liability insurance.14 0 The
court held that the county had not failed to use reasonable care
stating that "[r]easonable care does not require it to maintain a
constant patrol of walkways outside its buildings in order to keep
them free from bird droppings and windblown trash.""'4 According
to Coleman the court could have ruled that keeping the sidewalk
clear of pigeon droppings is a public duty, the breach of which
does not give rise to an action for any individual.
The City of Raleigh would have likely escaped liability if such
traditional tort principals had been applied. A jury could have eas-
ily found that the harm suffered by plaintiff's daughters was not a
foreseeable risk arising as a consequence of Officer Phillips' con-
duct." 2 Yet the impact of the decision, absolving the city of liabil-
amount of damages awarded exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) cumulatively to all claimants on account of injury and damage to any
one person." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1987).
138. 272 N.C. 94, 157 S.E.2d 611 (1967).
139. Id. at 95, 157 S.E.2d at 612.
140. Id. at 96, 157 S.E.2d at 613.
141. Id. at 97, 157 S.E.2d at 613-14.
142. See, e.g., Comment, Special Relationship, supra note 34, at 411-17. The
author notes that a physically injured homeowner may be precluded from recover-
ing from the governmental entity that issued the permit to the builder, the party
responsible for the building code violation, because under traditional tort duty
analysis, the builder "is in the best position to foresee and avoid possible injury
resulting from noncompliance." Id. at 411. The author states that using tradi-
tional tort analysis, rather than a special relationship exception to the public duty
doctrine, "allows full compliance with Washington statutes abrogating govern-
mental immunity by applying the same tort analysis to both private and govern-
mental defendants. Id.
Another example noted by the author where traditional tort principals would
work a better result than the special relationship test enunciated by Washington's
courts is Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975). In this
case the plaintiff phoned the city electrical inspector about a hot current running
through a creek on his property. The inspector found faulty wiring but failed to
shut off the electricity. Plaintiff's wife was subsequently electrocuted when at-
tempting to pull her son out of the creek. Id. at 412. The author states that the
plaintiff could not recover under the new special relationship test which requires
direct contact, express assurances and justifiable reliance. Id. However, the plain-
tiff could recover under a traditional tort analysis because duty would result if
plaintiff could show that the injury was foreseeable and proximately caused by
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ity because it is a public rather than a private tortfeasor, will pre-
vent many plaintiffs with meritorious claims from ever having their
day in court. The court applied the doctrine, which the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court in Schear accurately described as a "ghost of
sovereign immunity,1' 43 when the clear intent of the legislature, as
expressed in N.C.G.S. § 160A-485, was that governmental immu-
nity shall be no defense.144
The court of appeals in Coleman, offered another argument in
support of the public duty doctrine. 14 5 The court asserted that to
impose liability on public entities for negligence in providing pub-
lic services would result in excessive interference with legislative
and executive decision-making. 146 Yet courts have indirectly re-
viewed such decisions in the many actions brought pursuant to the
Tort Claims Act, or where recovery has been allowed because the
defendant city or county has purchased liability insurance.1 47 The
policy as expressed by the legislature in enacting those statutes is
that, when they apply, the state, municipality or county is to be
treated like a private litigant. 48
the defendant. Id. at 413. The author states that the result precluding recovery
lacks "substantive justification." Id.
Finally, the author states, A traditional tort duty analysis is a better analyti-
cal tool for determining government duty, because under a traditional tort duty
analysis the primary focus is on whether the government should owe a duty. Id. at
416-17.
143. 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728, 734 (1984).
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(c) provides, Any plaintiff may maintain a
tort claim against a city insured under this section in any court of competent
jurisdiction. As to any such claim, to the extent that the city is insured against
such claim pursuant to this section, governmental immunity shall be no de-
fense."(emphasis added).
145. 89 N.C. App. 188, 193, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1988) (quoting Riss, 240 N.E.2d
at 860-61).
146. Id.
147. See supra note 131 for cases in which the state, counties and cities have
been held liable.
148. See Guthrie v. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 299 S.E.2d 618 (1983),
where the court stated:
Traditionally the State has maintained its sovereign immunity in tort
actions. (citation omitted) However, the Tort Claims Act, as provided in
North Carolina General Statute 143-291 et. seq., waived the sovereign
immunity of the State in those instances in which injury is caused by the
negligence of a State employee and the injured person is not contribu-
torily negligent, giving the injured party the same right to sue as any
other litigant (emphasis added).
Id. at 535, 299 S.E.2d at 625.
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Conceding that government is not infallible, and that mistakes
are going to be made, who should bear the cost of those mistakes?
Longstanding policy consideratons underlying sovereign immunity
effectively maintained that the injured individual would bear the
risk.149 However, these longstanding policy considerations have
come under attack in recent years.1 50 Today very few jurisdictions
apply sovereign immunity in the form in which it was adopted.151
Because the public duty doctrine is nothing more than sovereign
immunity in sheep's clothing, 152 it should not be utilized to shift
Likewise, both counties, pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435, and cities,
pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485, waive any defense of immunity through
the purchase of liability insurance, thus giving the injured party the same right to
sue as any other litigant.
149. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 7, § 53.02, at 134. McQuillin notes that al-
though for many years courts continued to adhere to the doctrine of immunity
out of "shear weight of judicial authority," the major criticism directed against
the doctrine by "eminent jurists" and "distinguished legal scholars" was "that it
places on the individual damaged an inequitable burden which should be borne
by the community at large. . . ." Id.
150. See Comment, Local Government Sovereign Immunity, supra note 1, at
54. The author states:
The arguments historically advanced for retention of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine have been eclipsed by modern developments that re-
strict its applicability. Prominently included among these developments
are the expansion of local government activities, with a concomitant in-
crease in the risk of harm to citizens, and the availability of liability in-
surance to cover those risks. Additionally, the courts have recognized it is
unjust to preclude recovery by a party injured by a local government and
that the general public, rather than the injured party, should pay for the
risks arising from governmental activities.
Id.
151. See generally, McQuILLIN, supra note 7, § 53.02, at 132-37. McQuillin
provides a good history of the decline of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
states.
152. See Note, Government Liability, supra note 22, at 513. The author
states that "[a]lthough the main difference between sovereign immunity and the
public duty doctrine is only theoretical, strict application of the public duty doc-
trine resurrects complete sovereign immunity as to public officers." Id., See also
Note, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells the Police that Liability Looms for
Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333,
335-39 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Sorichetti]. The author, commenting on the his-
tory of sovereign immunity, notes that "[t]he essence of the rule is the notion that
'because we [the police] owe a duty to everybody, we owe it to nobody.'" Id. at
366 (citing Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting)). The author states that al-
though immunity for municipalities in New York was abrogated in 1945 when the
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the burden of irresponsible government action onto the innocent
victim.158 As Judge Keating stated in Riss, the public duty doctrine
"is premised upon a legal rule which long ago should have been
abandoned, having lost any justification it might once have
had. 15
4
court held that the city's immunity was an extension of the state's, and thus abro-
gated by the Court of Claims Act, "[flearing possible financial disaster for the
cities and a flood of litigation, the courts preserved the concept of immunity as
applied to police departments, but under the guise of the 'public duty' doctrine."
Id. at 339.
153. See Note, Government Liability, supra note 22, at 537-38. The author
states:
It is further submitted that equitable loss spreading further man-
dates the abrogation of the public duty doctrine. It is suggested that once
the requirements of traditional negligence analysis are satisfied, the mu-
nicipality and the police department should bear the burden of damages
as opposed to the innocent victim, because even a small municipality
normally has financial resources far beyond those of a private citizen.
Id. at 537. See also Note, Sorichetti, supra note 152, at 338. The author, referring
to a statement by the United States Supreme court on risk-spreading, states:
[B]ecause the public receives the benefit of government, the public
should bear the loss caused by the negligence of government employees.
The unfortunate individuals upon whom the injuries fall should not
alone bear the societal cost of police mistakes; the government defend-
ants who generally possess superior loss-bearing capacity should bear the
societal cost.
Id. (citing, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980)). See also
Note, Police Liability, supra note 22, at 834. The author states, The burden to
minimize losses from crime should fall on the police rather than the victims be-
cause the police are in a better position to prevent crime." Id. The author states
that this is especially true where the police are aware of a particular danger, but
foresee no particular victim. Id. The author cites as an example the case of a
drunken driver who the police are aware of, but fail to arrest. The author states
that there is little that others on the road can do to protect themselves from the
driver's recklessness. Id. For an example of the problem see, Shore v. Town of
Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982) (Police stopped drunken driver,
but failed to arrest. Driver subsequently involved in collision with plaintiff's dece-
dent. Court denied cause of action for wrongful death stating that police owed no
special duty to plaintiff's decedent).
154. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 580, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968).
(Keating, J. dissenting). Judge Keating further states, "Despite almost universal
condemnation by legal scholars, the rule survives, finding its continuing strength,
not in its power to persuade, but in its ability to arouse unwarranted judicial fears
of the consequences of overturning it." Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in Coleman may have intended to limit
application of the public duty doctrine only to situations where a
duty to provide police protection is alleged. However, now that the
doctrine has found its way into the case law of this state it will no
doubt be applied in situations involving other types of public ser-
vices.155 The police should be liable if sovereign immunity has been
waived when the police fail to carry out a duty owed to citizens
when it is foreseeable that a failure to carry out the duty may re-
sult in injury to a specific individual. A preferred status should not
be extended to the public officer. This preferred status would leave
the injured party without recourse. 56
155. Since the Coleman decision, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
denied two more causes of action based on a conclusory application of the public
duty doctrine. In Martin v. Mondie, 94 N.C. App. 750, 381 S.E.2d 481 (1989) the
court upheld summary judgment of the trial court against the plaintiff who
brought action against the Town alleging that the police department's negligence
in failing to execute three arrest warrants was proximate cause of his injuries. The
plaintiff was injured when the subject of the arrest warrants, while driving intoxi-
cated, collided head-on with plaintiff. In Lynch v. N.C. Dept. of Justice, 93 N.C.
App. 57, 376 S.E.2d 247 (1989) the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of a claim for wrongful death against law enforcement officers alleging that
their recklessness in attempting to apprehend fleeing criminals while the
criminals had in their custody the plaintiff's children was proximate cause of the
deaths of those children.
156. Lynch v. N. C. Dept. of Justice, 93 N.C. App. 57, 376 S.E.2d 247 (1989).
Lynch provides a clear picture of the injustice of the public duty doctrine. This
case involved the tragic deaths of the plaintiff's two small children. At the time of
their deaths the children were in the custody of two murder suspects. Id. at 58,
376 S.E.2d at 248. The defendant law enforcement agents staked out the premises
where the suspects were hiding. Id. The defendants, upon observing the suspects
leave with the children in an automobile, pursued the suspects. Id. at 58-59, 376
S.E.2d at 248. During the chase, the suspects fired at the defendants with a sub-
machine gun. Id. at 59, 276 S.E.2d at 248. Later during the pursuit the suspects
gave the children lethal doses of cyanide, and shot them in the head. Id. The
suspects then detonated a bomb, killing themselves. Id.
The plaintiff alleged in his cause of action that the defendants were negligent
and reckless in undertaking to arrest the suspects while the children were in their
custody. Id. at 58, 376 S.E.2d at 248. The court held that the cause of action could
not be maintained because the defendants owed no legal duty to the children, and
there was no special relationship between the defendants and the children. Id. at
60, 376 S.E.2d at 249. The court stated that plaintiff's argument that defendants
should have waited until the children were elsewhere to attempt the arrest is in-
consistent with the police duty to protect the public from dangerous criminals. Id.
at 60-61, 346 S.E.2d at 249.
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This Note addresses the true nature of the public duty doc-
trine. Although the public duty doctrine has gathered support over
the years, the recent trend views the doctrine as a function of sov-
ereign immunity. The policy of sovereign immunity is outweighed
by the need to compensate citizens injured by public defendants.
The public duty doctrine must yield to this need as well.
David S. Bowers
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